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Abstract: We theoretically discuss the potential macroeconomic influences on MFIs’ depth of 
outreach and provide empirical evidence, using panel analysis, to investigate determinants of 
average loan balance per borrower as a percentage of national GNI per capita (ALB), as a proxy 
indicator for poverty focus or depth of outreach. ALB is found to be positively associated with 
operational self-sufficiency, a finding that is consistent with the mission drift hypothesis. But it is 
also positively associated with the shares in GDP of net foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
domestic credit to the private sector (DCPS). This suggests mission drift is associated not only 
with MFI-specific factors, but also influence by macroeconomic context. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last decade, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have grown rapidly in many developing 
countries. Many differ from commercial financial institutions, which aim solely for 
profit-maximization, by combining a social mission with financial performance goals. Although 
their social mission varies, most MFIs focus on reducing poverty and promoting social inclusion 
by tailoring the financial services they offer to demand from relatively poor people. In recent years 
this has been affected by a trend from non-profit status towards full commercialization. This raises 
the question of mission drift - whether profit-seeking behavior is resulting in less emphasis on 
serving poor customers.  
  Fulfillment of the social mission of MFIs can be measured by outreach to poor clients, taking 
into account both number of clients and how poor they are, or breadth of outreach and depth of 
outreach. Social mission also includes outreach to women customers (Bhatt & Tang, 2001; Cull et 
al. 2007; Mersland & Strm, 2010; Hermes et al., 2011; Quayes, 2012; Louis et al., 2013). In 
microfinance, breadth of outreach is mainly measured by the number of people the MFI provides 
financial services to (especially credit) over a specific period. Depth of outreach is related to the 
income level of borrowers: the poorer they are in money terms the greater the depth of outreach. 
Outreach to women customers is usually measured by the percentage of women borrowers to total 
borrowers. With the tremendous growth in microfinance in the last decade, plenty of MFIs have 
significantly expanded breadth of outreach (Quayes, 2012). At the same time, outreach to women 
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customers has been fairly high and stable (Cull et al., 2007; Hermes et al., 2011; Quayes, 2012; 
Louis et al., 2013). In relation to the discussion of outreach in microfinance, the primary focus of 
academics is on depth of outreach, and this is also the focus of our paper. 
In this paper, with respect to the mission drift issue, we contribute to the literature in two ways. 
First, after controlling for MFI-specific variables, the empirical results show that the potential 
trade-off between MFIs’ financial performance and depth of outreach depends upon the 
macroeconomic environment. Second, we discuss potential influences of the macroeconomic 
environment on MFIs’ depth of outreach and provide empirical evidence in support of  
theoretical hypotheses linking the two. To our knowledge, there are a very few studies in the 
microfinance literature that empirically explore how depth of MFI outreach is affected by 
theirfinancial performance  and macroeconomic environment aspect simultaneously. Drawing on 
data for 218 MFIs in 76 countries between 2001 and 2011, this paper uses panel models to 
investigate determinants of average loan balance per borrower as a percentage of national GNI per 
capita (ALB), as a proxy indicator for depth of outreach. ALB is found to be positively associated 
with operational self-sufficiency, a finding that is consistent with the mission drift hypothesis. But 
it is also positively associated with the shares in GDP of net foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
domestic credit to the private sector (DCPS).  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature. 
Section 3 elaborates on the potential influences of macroeconomic environment on MFIs’ depth of 
outreach. Section 4 provides a description of the data source and variables. Section 5 demonstrates 
empirical evidence on the determinants of depth of outreach combining both MFIs’ financial 
performance and the macroeconomic environment aspect. Section 6 provides conclusions and 
discusses the implications of our results.  
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In terms of the measure of depth of outreach, there are some differences among microfinance 
researchers. Average loan balance per borrower is widely used as the proxy for depth of outreach 
(Bhatt & Tang, 2001; Schreiner, 2002; Mersland & Strm, 2010; Hermes et al., 2011). These 
researchers argue that the smaller loan size is consistent with poorer borrowers’ loan demand. 
Bigger average loan balance per borrower implies less depth of outreach. But Christen (2000) 
predicts that larger loan balances of more commercial MFIs do not definitely represent mission 
drift, as it is possibly related to these MFIs’ choice of strategy, period of entering the microcredit 
market, or rising borrowing capacity of the target customers. Armendáriz and Szafarz (2011) also 
argue that MFIs extending larger loan sizes to  borrowers does not necessarily mean that those 
MFIs have shifted away from their social mission as MFIs may be cross subsidizing, which is 
more possible in countries or regions where there is a large unbanked population that includes not 
only  very poor people but also better-off customers. Some researchers use average loan size per 
borrower/GNI or GNP per capita as the proxy for depth of outreach (Cull et al.，2007; Quayes, 
2012; Louis et al., 2013).1 This focuses research on the extent to which MFIs depart from a 
general trend towards larger loans in richer countries or regions where they are located. In our 
                                                             
1Cull et al. (2007) also use average loan size/GNP per capita of poorest 20% of population as an additional variable 
for measuring depth of outreach. 
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study, we use average loan size per borrower/GNI per capita as the proxy for depth of outreach.2 
On the issue of whether mission drift has occurred among MFIs recent empirical research does 
not reach aconsistent conclusion. (Mersland & Strm, 2010; Quayes, 2012; Louis et al., 2013). 
Mersland & Strm(2010) use average loan size as their main proxy and MFIs’ lending 
methodology, and main market (urban/rural) and gender as further measures of mission drift. They 
use a GMM estimator based on 379 MFIs in 74 countries during the period 1998-2008 to estimate 
whether MFIs depart from their social mission by catering to better off customers. Their analysis 
indicates no significant increase in average loan size or the fraction of urban customers for these 
MFIs.. But their regressions do reveal that an increase in average profit and average cost is 
associated with increased average loan size and other measures of mission drift, implying mission 
drift may occur if MFIs seek higher financial returns. In a more recent study, Quayes (2012) uses 
data from 702 MFIs operating in 83 countries to reveals a positive complementary relationship 
between depth of outreach and financial sustainability for  high-disclosure MFIs3; but for 
low-disclosure MFIshe finds evidence that is consistent with a trade-off between outreach and 
financial sustainability. Louis et al. (2013) investigate the association between social performance 
and financial performance of MFIs using self-organizing maps methodology. Their results show 
that there is a significant positive relationship between social and financial performance.  
The debate over whether MFIs drift from their social mission as they aim at better-off 
customers has also been exploredI as a potential trade-off between social performance and 
financial performance, . where depth of outreach is an  important proxy for measuring social 
performance. (Copestake, 2007; Cull et al., 2007; Hermes et al., 2011). Copestake (2007) provides 
a theoretical framework for analysing trade-offs between financial and social performance. He 
suggests that mission drift can more precisely be defined as ex post changes in stated preferences 
to fit unplanned performance outcomes., He reviews the extent to which poverty oriented MFIs 
are able to avoid mission drift through better social performance management, and explores the 
scope for more systematic balancing of social and financial goals across national retail financial 
services sectors. Cull et al. (2007) show trade-offs emerge between profitability and serving the 
poorest through analyzing financial performance and outreach of 124 MFIs in 49 developing 
countries from 1999 to 2002. They find that this depends on an MFI’s lending method, that  
charging high interest rates does not ensure greater profitability, and that the benefits of 
cost-cutting diminish when MFIs serve better-off clients. Their evidence also illustrates the 
possibility of earning profits while serving poor clients. Moreover, Cull et al. (2007) find the 
                                                             
2Some researchers also use lending methodology as a further mission drift measure (Mersland & Strm, 2010). 
They point out that MFIs mainly adopt group lending methodology for poorer customers, but for better-off 
borrowers, MFIs mainly adopt individual lending methodology. Those MFIs which have higher ratio of individual 
lending methodology may also be experiencing mission drift. We think that using lending methodology as the 
proxy for depth of outreach may be misleading. Microfinance has been developing over thirty years around the 
world, and more and more MFIs have  adopted the individual lending mode because itis more flexible and simple 
for customers. E MFIs that have been operating in the microfinance market for a long time and have accumulated 
plenty of borrowers’ credit informationdo not need to rely on group guarantees as a collateral substitute any longer. 
For example, while Grameen Bank in Bangladesh originally advocated group lending methodology, but 
subsequently relaxed the binding guarantee responsibility of group members. 
3 High disclosure MFIs provide more accurate information to the Mix Market (Quayes, 2012). 
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positive relationship between profitability and average loan size is insignificant in their base 
regressions. However, they find that larger loan sizes are related to lower average costs for both 
individual-based lenders and solidarity group lenders. Hermes et al. (2011) provide strong 
evidence that outreach is negatively associated with efficiency of MFIs by using stochastic 
frontier analysis for 435 MFIs from year 1997 to 2007. They find that MFIs having lower average 
loan balances and more female borrowers are less efficient. Their research suggests that improving 
cost efficiency may only be achieved by focusing less on the poor for MFIs.  
Other researchers have revealed additional complexity in the determinants of MFIs’ depth of 
outreach by investigating macroeconomic factors beyond MFI specific characteristics. (for 
example, Marconi & Mosley, 2006; Krauss & Walter, 2009; Ahlin et al., 2011; Annim, 2012; 
Vanroose & D’Espallier, 2013).  Annim (2012) and Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) both find 
that macroeconomic environment also affects MFIs’ outreach and performance in addition to 
institution-specific characteristics. Annim (2012) asserts that there exists complementarity 
between the external environment such as credit information, property rights and financial 
development, and MFIs’ social performance. He employs both parametric and non-parametric 
efficiency estimation techniques based on data for 164 MFIs over the period 2004-2008, finding 
that bureaucracies in property registration and a lack of credit information negatively influence the 
social performance of MFIs.    
 
3 MACROECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON MFIs MISSION DRIFT 
 
In this section we discuss in turn how domestic financial development, foreign direct investment, 
inflation, percent of rural population and credit information of the countries in which MFIs 
operate influence the depth of outreach of MFIs. 
 
Domestic financial development 
Surprisingly few studies have investigated the relationship between financial development and 
MFIs’ outreach. Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) indicate that MFIs reach more clients and are 
more profitable in countries where access to traditional banking services is low. They attribute this 
result to market-failure: MFIs perform better where the formal financial sector fails. But they also 
demonstrate that MFIs’ depth of outreach is greater in countries with more developed financial 
systems, where banks and MFIs stand in more direct competition with each other. They argue that 
more intense competition may hold MFIs down market, and thereby make mission drift less likely.  
In contrast, in a study based on data collected from 362 MFIs in 73 countries, Assefa et al. 
(2013:778) find that while access to private credit from banks and other regulated financial 
institutions is negatively associated with breadth of outreach it is positively and significantly 
correlated with loan size. In a developed financial system, MFIs may find it easier to engage with 
wealthier individual customers who can absorb larger loans: a process referred to as MFI 
“upscaling”. But direct competition from commercial banks for those clients also forces MFIs to 
lend larger amounts. Consequently, the depth of outreach of MFIs, as measured by average loan 
size, may be lowered. This highlights the complexity of the relationship between the financial 
development and the depth of outreach of MFIs. In a most competitive financial system they have 
to balance competing with commercial banks by upscaling with competing with each other and 
with “downscaling” commercial banks for poorer clients. MFIs not only face competition from 
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commercial banks for wealthier individual customers, microenterprises and small enterprises, but 
also for traditional microfinance customers. Thus variation in MFI’s average loan size may reflect 
the combination of selectively moving up market, and moving down market to sustain or enlarge 
their share in the microfinance market.  
 
Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment may have direct and indirect negative influences on the depth of 
outreach of MFIs. On the one hand, FDI may have a direct negative impact on the depth of 
outreach of MFIs. In recent years, in the light of commercialization in microfinance, more and 
more foreign investors have entered the microfinance industry due to its profitability and light 
regulation in many developing countries. Foreign direct investors especially those profit-oriented 
investors in the microfinance industry usually emphasize the financial performance of  MFIs they 
invest in rather than their social performance. Vanroose & D’Espallier (2013) reveal in their study 
of 1,073 MFIs that more FDI is associated with higher profitability for MFIs. MFIs in receipt of 
FDI, especially more commercially oriented FDI, may prefer to extend larger loans to wealthier or 
better-off clients than to provide small loans to poorer customers. If so, this would explain a direct 
negative association between FDI and the depth of outreach of MFIs.    
In addition, FDI may have an indirect negative influence on the depth of outreach of MFIs. 
Greater FDI inflows may raise wage employment and create demand complementarities raising 
the borrowing capacity of potential clients,  encouraging MFIs to offer larger loans, , as predicted 
by Ahlin et al. (2011). As the loanable funds of MFIs are constrained by limited financial 
resources, this may cause MFIs to reduce the loan portfolio allocated to the poor. Thus, depth of 
outreach of MFIs may be lowered.  
 
Inflation 
Inflation may be negatively related to the depth of outreach of MFIs. Vanroose and D’Espallier 
(2013) show that MFIs’ profitability is negatively associated with inflation. Ahlin et al. (2011) 
reveal that inflation is consistently and strongly correlated with MFI’s higher average interest rate 
and high cost of funds. MFIs may respond to inflation with upward interest rate adjustments. They 
also predict that higher inflation leads to slower (real) loan-size growth of MFIs. We argue that 
inflation may cause MFIs to react by increasing the portion of larger loans to relatively wealthier 
clients, as the poor customers are more vulnerable to higher borrowing costs and inflation risk. 
Moreover, poor customers’ demand for microloans may be more weakened as compared to 
wealthier clients. In this sense, inflation may be negatively associated with the depth of outreach 
of MFIs. 
 
Rural poverty rate 
  Rural poverty rate is the percentage of the rural population living below the national rural 
poverty line. Many MFIs primarily operate in rural areas. Theoretically, to have higher depth of 
outreach in rural areas, MFIs need a higher percentage of the rural population to be living under 
the rural poverty line, thus rural poverty rate may be positively associated with depth of outreach 
of MFIs. To some extent, higher rural poverty rate is related to lower economic development level 
in rural areas. Only a few studies discuss the relationship between rural poverty rate and depth of 
outreach. Some researchers just use percent of rural population as a measure of poverty level 
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(Ahlin et al., 2011; Assefa et al., 2013; Vanroose & D’ Espallier, 2013). We argue that the percent 
of rural population is not necessarily associated with poverty level. MFIs may have fewer 
opportunities for extending microloans to wealthier individual customers, microenterprises and 
small and middle-sized enterprises in areas with higher rural poverty rate. Furthermore, poor 
customers in these areas rely more heavily on MFIs for borrowing funds as compared to the 
clients in other areas. Hence, poor borrowers in areas with higher rural poverty rate may have 
greater credit discipline which is beneficial to reducing MFIs’ default ratio, providing incentive for 
MFIs to reach greater depth of outreach. In summary, rural poverty rate may be positively related 
to depth of outreach of MFIs. 
 
Credit information 
By credit information we refer to the scope, accessibility and quality of information about 
outstanding loans available through public and private credit reporting systems. From a theoretical 
perspective, depth of credit information may have a positive influence on the depth of outreach of 
MFIs. Availability of reliable credit information is very important for MFIs to make efficient 
lending decisions, especially when the borrowers lack eligible collateral or appropriate third-party 
guarantors, which is very common among MFIs’ customers. In this case, reliable credit 
information may act as a partial substitute for collateral and borrower guarantees. An efficient 
credit reporting system is beneficial to reducing information asymmetry between credit transaction 
parties, to alleviating borrowers’ moral hazard and adverse selection problems. It helps to improve 
MFIs’ credit risk management, to strengthen credit constraints on the borrowers and to raise the 
availability of microloans. Hence, depth of credit information provided by credit reporting system 
should have a positive impact on the depth of outreach of MFIs. 
Overall, as discussed above, the influences of macroeconomic environment on the depth of 
outreach of MFIs are complex. We will empirically estimate the potential impact of the domestic 
financial development, foreign direct investment, inflation, percent of rural population and credit 
information on the depth of outreach of MFIs in section 5. 
            
4 DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
In order to reveal whether there is a potential trade-off between MFIs’ financial performance and 
depth of outreach, and to explore the impact of country-specific macroeconomic environment on the 
depth of outreach, we set up panel models based on observation for 218 MFIs in 76 countries during 
the period 2001- 2011. The MFI data in our sample are sourced from the Microfinance Information 
Exchange (MIX) market database. MIX is a global web-based microfinance information platform 
which provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date information on MFIs’ financial performance 
and outreach. Most of the empirical studies in the microfinance literature use data from this source. 
However, this information does have limitations. First, while it is audited most of the data is 
self-reported. Second, there is the problem of self-selection of MFIs into the sample. In order to 
minimize the problems mentioned above, we select MFIs in the MIX Market database according to 
three criteria: first, we select only MFIs that belong to the highest two levels out of five levels of 
data quality;4 second, in each country, we randomly choose no more than four MFIs to make our 
                                                             
4The MIX market classifies reporting MFIs into ﬁve categories (one-diamond through to ﬁve-diamonds) based 
upon its assessment of the amount and reliability of information reported. 
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sample more representative; third, since there are missing values for some MFIs in several years, we 
only select MFIs that have available information over five years during the period 2001-2011. Hence, 
while not strictly representative of all MFIs operating, the data for those selected is relatively reliable 
and comprehensive. 
    The data we use for country-specific macroeconomic environment variables are all sourced from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI). WDI is World Bank’ primary collection of development 
indicators, compiled from officially-recognized international sources. It presents the most current 
and accurate global development data available. 
The dependent variable in our model is average loan balance per borrower / GNI per capita (ALB). 
The independent variables include three categories: financial performance variables, MFI-specific 
control variables and macroeconomic environment variables.  
    We use four indicators to measure financial performance of MFIs: operational self-sufficiency (OSS), 
return on equity (ROE), financial revenue divided by average total assets (FRA), and the loan portfolio 
at risk >30 days ratio (PAR30). The MFI-specific control variables are AGE and SCALE. Our model 
also includes FDI, DCPS, INF, CD and RPR as the country-level macroeconomic environment variables. 
FDI denotes net inflows of foreign direct investment (% of GDP), DCPS refers to domestic credit to 
private sector (% of GDP), INF represents annual percentage rate of consumer price inﬂation,5 CD 
denotes credit depth of information index and RPR refers to rural poverty rate. The further explanations 
of all variables in the empirical analysis are presented as follows: 
 
(a) Dependent variable: Average loan balance per borrower / GNI per capita (ALB) 
  
   As discussed in Section 1, average loan balance per borrower divided by GNI per capita is the main 
proxy used for depth of outreach in microfinance. Greater value of ALB is generally believed to imply 
lower depth of outreach, thus, greater possibility of mission drift. 
 
(b) Financial performance variables 
 
   Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) is the main indicator used for measuring an MFI’s financial 
performance. It is defined as financial revenue divided by total expense which equals the sum of 
financial expense, loan loss provision expense and operating expense. The value of OSS greater 
than 100% implies that the MFI has sufficient revenue to cover its costs and is operationally 
sustainable. OSS is widely used by researchers for discussing the relationship between financial 
sustainability and outreach of MFIs ( for example, Cull et al., 2007; Copestake, 2007; Ahlin et al., 
2011; Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2014; Quayes, 2012). ROE measures the utilization 
efficiency of equity capital and profitability of MFIs. FRA is the ratio of financial revenue to 
average total assets, and a proxy for the average interest rate charged by MFIs. PAR30 is the 
fraction of the loan portfolio at risk for more than 30 days past due. PAR30 is an early risk warning 
indicator of loan default problems and hence a measure of loan portfolio quality. This indicator is 
also widely used in microfinance research (for example, Cull et al.,2007; Gonzalez, 2007; 
Mersland & Strm, 2010; Ahlin et al., 2011; Louis et al., 2013).  
   
                                                             
5Since the effect of inflation has a time lag, we constructed the index with a one year time lag. 
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(c) MFI-specific Control variables 
 
Here, we define two MFI-specific control variables as dummy variables. First, AGE measures the 
number of years since a MFI was established. This variable is classified into three categories: new, 
young and mature. A MFI categorized as new has operated no more than five years, and 
categorized as young has operated between five and eight years. When a MFI has operated more 
than eight years, it is categorized as mature. The variable takes the value of one if the MFI is new, 
the value of two for the young MFI and three for the mature MFI respectively.   
 Second, SCALE reflects the portfolio scale of a MFI and is classified into three levels: small, 
medium and large. The scale of an MFI’s portfolio depends on the region in which it operates. An 
MFI categorized as small has a portfolio of less than $2 million in all regions except Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) where it is defigned as having a portfolio of less than $4 million. When 
the MFI’s portfolio is between $2 and $8 million it is categorized as medium in all regions except 
LAC where the range is between $4 and $15 million. An MFI categorized as large has a portfolio 
exceeding $8 million in all regions except LAC, where the minimum is $15 million. We give a 
value of one for a small MFI, two for medium, and three for large. 
 
(d) Country-specific macroeconomic environment variables 
 
     DCPS refers to the private credit to GDP ratio, such as through loans, purchase of non-equity 
securities, and trade credits. This indicator is one of the most accepted measures of the domestic 
financial development of a country in the finance and growth literature (King and Levine, 1993; 
Levine, 2005). FDI is also an important macroeconomic environment indicator.  FDI can be 
regarded as a proxy measure for the economic openness of a country.  Inflation (INF) is measured 
by the consumer price index. . Credit depth of information index (CD) is used for measuring rules 
affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available via public or private 
credit registries. The index ranges from zero to six, the higher the value the greater the coverage 
depth and better the quality of information. Rural poverty rate (RPR) is the percentage of the rural 
population living below the national rural poverty line. 
 
(e) Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables we have used in the empirical analysis. 
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                 Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
ALB 0.772683 1.866444 0 34.5017 2102 
FRA 0.274866 0.124102 0 1.1671 1967 
ROE 0.102836 0.236429 -2.7561 2.4421 1969 
OSS 1.195775 0.372586 0 6.6722 2101 
PAR30 0.050506 0.070141 0 0.9634 1921 
AGE 2.585072 0.667159 1 3 2157 
SCALE 2.183465 0.826639 1 3 2153 
FDI 0.046239 0.05352 -0.02499 0.538108 2377 
DCPS 0.323721 0.251318 0.007735 1.67536 2351 
INF 0.107416 0.406046 -0.13226 7.286657 2291 
CD 3.305006 2.138231 0 6 1718 
RPR 0.4616515 0.1899768 0.088 0.834 743 
 
 
    Next we calculate the mean values of MFIs’ outreach and financial performance variables in 
each year during the period 2001-2011 to acquire the change trend of variables. Mean values of 
MFIs’ outreach and financial performance variables are summarized in Table 2. 
 
   Table 2.  Mean values of MFIs’ outreach and financial performance variables 
YEAR ALB FRA PAR30 ROE OSS 
2001 65.87% 30.21% 4.71% 6.17% 112.91% 
2002 74.00% 30.50% 5.37% 10.63% 120.17% 
2003 74.23% 28.58% 5.62% 7.17% 119.77% 
2004 70.69% 28.30% 4.70% 12.26% 125.41% 
2005 83.19% 27.61% 4.52% 11.43% 121.17% 
2006 86.15% 27.52% 4.00% 11.23% 119.76% 
2007 94.67% 26.62% 3.38% 12.38% 126.03% 
2008 74.09% 28.26% 4.40% 13.64% 121.44% 
2009 70.99% 25.74% 6.46% 7.83% 113.69% 
2010 76.57% 25.95% 6.55% 7.33% 115.42% 
2011 71.74% 26.61% 5.94% 10.14% 116.91% 
 
    Table 2 presents mean values of outreach and financial performance variables of the 218 MFIs 
during the period 2001-2011. It shows that average loan balance per borrower / GNI per capita 
(ALB) increased from 2001 to 2007, but then fell sharply, and has since fluctuated. Financial 
revenue divided by assets (FRA) decreased from 2001 to 2011. The fraction of the loan portfolio 
at risk for more than 30 days past due (PAR30) fluctuated without trend during 2001-2007, but  
increased significantly from 2007 to 2010.. Return on equity (ROE) also fluctuated during the 
period. In each year between 2001 and 2011, the mean value of operational self-sufficiency (OSS) 
was greater than 100%, revealing most of the MFIs in the sample were operationally sustainable, 
although this probably also reflects self-selection of MFIs reporting to the MIX market. 
    Table 3 provides mean values of the macroeconomic environment variables. It shows that 
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foreign direct investment of the countries in which MFIs operate increased on average during the 
specific period. Domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP increased significantly 
during 2001-2011, from around 26% in 2001 to 40% in 2011, which indicates more credit 
resources were provided to the private sector, and the overall financial depth of the countries had 
improved. Consumer price inflation fluctuated during the period, while the rural poverty rate 
generally decreased over the period. Credit depth of information index increased substantially over 
the period, indicating a general improvement in the availability of credit information in most of the 
countries covered.  
 
Table 3.  Mean values of macroeconomic environment variables 
YEAR FDI DCPS INF RPR CD 
2001 0.028371 0.260904 0.205627 0.5838889 N/A 
2002 0.03131 0.252457 0.168551 0.4733953 N/A 
2003 0.038204 0.26114 0.069291 0.513675 N/A 
2004 0.043209 0.272177 0.066996 0.5483269 2.282297 
2005 0.042357 0.292154 0.067647 0.4915869 2.629108 
2006 0.057737 0.313881 0.077498 0.4915869 2.934579 
2007 0.066161 0.356199 0.070511 0.4533333 3.191589 
2008 0.060455 0.377019 0.071189 0.435803 3.528037 
2009 0.042358 0.385946 0.129669 0.4248333 3.747706 
2010 0.045846 0.393353 0.186962 0.3859745 3.986239 
2011 0.051505 0.400419 0.072246 0.4099984 4.077982 
 
Lastly, the description of institutional-specific variables is summarized in Table 4. As the MIX 
market imposes strict data quality criteria on the reporting MFIs (including requiring MFIs to 
provide audited financial reports for at least three consecutive years) it is easily understandable 
that the majority of MFIs in the sample are labeled mature institutions and are relatively large 
scale. 
Table 4.  Description of institutional-specific variables 
     （Total observations：2398） 
Variables Number of observations Percentage 
AGE   
new 218 9.09% 
young 459 19.14% 
mature 1480 61.72% 
missing 241 10.05% 
   
SCALE   
small 574 23.94% 
medium 610 25.44% 
large 969 40.41% 
missing 245 10.22% 
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5 MODELS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
  As explained above, the focus of our empirical analysis is on revealing whether there is a  
trade-off between MFIs’ financial performance and depth of outreach, and exploring macroeconomic 
influences on the depth of outreach. In addition, we include two MFI-specific control variables, 
which may also influence the depth of outreach of MFIs. We set up five panel models adding the five 
macroeconomic environment variables (DCPS, FDI, INF, CD and RPR) progressively. The five 
equations we estimate are as follows: 
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    Before doing the estimations, we use Stata 12 to determine the appropriate form of each model 
(fixed or random effects) by using the Hausman chi-square test,. A fixed effects model imposes 
time independent effects for each entity that is possibly correlated with the regressors, whereas 
random effects model assumes regressors are uncorrelated with the unobserved effect. The results 
of the Hausman chi-square test show that in equations (1), (2), (3) and (4), fixed effects model is 
more reasonable than random effects model. Hence we chose the fixed effects model in equations 
(1), (2), (3) and (4), and a random effects model in equation (5). 
Table 5 summarizes the regression outputs from the panel models estimated using fixed effects or 
random effects, columns (1) to (5) present the results of the estimations for equations (1) to (5) 
respectively.  
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Table 5.  Results of the estimations 
 ALB ALB ALB ALB ALB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Financial 
performance 
variables 
     
OSS 
0.2212842    
(0.0884523)** 
0.2121955    
(0.0893312)**  
0.2146888    
(0.0920021)** 
0.142687    
(0.1104206) 
0.8015921    
(0.4372436)* 
ROE 
-0.2005854    
(0.1254003) 
-0.1919521    
(0.125475) 
-0.2105213    
(0.1303082) 
-0.2961807    
(0.1665464)* 
-0.8369889    
(0.6611307) 
PAR30 
-0.4775848    
(0.3793168) 
-0.4523179    
(0.3807982) 
-0.467626    
(0.3913379) 
-0.6004214    
(0.4918093) 
-0.8882009   
(1.210639) 
FRA 
-0.8569826    
(0.3302692)*** 
-0.7842007    
(0.3321774)** 
-0.8220889    
(0.3438451)** 
-0.9330875    
(0.5146514)* 
-2.369158    
(0.9672638)** 
Control 
variables 
     
AGE 
-0.1266028   
(0.0530951)** 
-0.1221182    
(0.0537188)** 
-0.1224487    
(0.0566625)** 
-0.1038815    
(0.0766925) 
-0.3213243    
(0.2177161) 
SCALE 
0.0535097    
(0.0478662) 
0.0564701    
(0.0480089) 
0.0506952    
(0.049882) 
0.0468618    
(0.0707035) 
0.2582502    
(0.1418698)* 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
     
DCPS 
0.5514174    
(0.2645816)** 
0.500011    
(0.2696553)* 
0.5965572    
(0.2876747)** 
1.084237    
(0.3754186)*** 
0.398675    
(0.6007716) 
FDI  
1.112355    
(0.4979058)** 
1.05415    
(0.5150914)** 
1.153535     
(0.616103)* 
3.372368   
(1.646138)** 
INF   
0.0350879    
(0.0701251) 
0.0383394    
(0.0751981) 
0.8448131   
(1.297333) 
 
CD 
 
   
-0.0366482    
(0.0252071) 
-0.081777    
(0.0533116)   
RPR     
0.4053339    
(0.5966754) 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, and SEs are listed 
in parentheses. 
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In columns (1) (2) (3) and (5), we find the coefficient of the primary financial performance 
variable OSS is positive and highly significant. In addition, in column (4), the coefficient of OSS 
is also positive, though not significant. This suggests average loan size per borrower/ GNI per 
capita increases with the improvement of operational self-sufficiency, which implies there is a 
potential trade-off between financial sustainability and the depth of outreach of MFIs. We infer 
from this that for MFIs pursuing higher OSS, there is a risk of mission drift, proxied by reduced 
depth of outreach. . This result is in line with the findings of Cull et al. (2007) and Hermes et al. 
(2011), but in contrast with the conclusions of Mersland & Strm (2010), Quayes (2012) and 
Louis et al. (2013).  
  Interestingly, the coefficient of ROE is negative and significant at the 10% level in column (4), 
which implies that after allowing for the influences of DCPS, FDI, INF and CD on the depth of 
outreach MFIs which reach poorer customers can also achieve more favorable returns on equity. 
The coefficient of PAR30 is not significant in all columns, thus the relationship between PAR30 
and depth of outreach in the empirical analysis remains uncertain. Not surprisingly, the coefficient 
of FRA is negative and significant in each column, which confirms that smaller loans are 
associated with higher interest rates, reflecting the differential pricing strategy across MFIs. 
 With respect to the correlation between macroeconomic environment variables and the depth 
of outreach, the results in columns (1) through (5) suggest the following. First, Table 5 shows that 
in all columns, DCPS is positively correlated with average loan size per borrower/ GNI per capita, 
though in column (5) the coefficient is not significant. This result suggests that higher credit 
availability from the private sector might be negatively associated with the MFIs’ depth of 
outreach. This is in line with the findings of Assefa et al. (2013) and Vanroose & D’Espallier 
(2013), and with the argument that financial development is associated with MFI upscaling 
reduced depth of outreach. Second, in columns (2) to (5) FDI is positively and significantly related 
to ALB in all four specifications, which is consistent with the theories advanced that it can directly 
and/or indirectly induce upward mission drift. Third, the coefficient of the variable INF in 
columns (3) to (5) is positive, bu statistically insignificant. Fourth, the coefficients of the variable 
CD in columns (4) and (5) are both negative, but not significant. Last, the association between 
RPR and ALB remains uncertain in column (5). Overall, we find some evidence that 
macroeconomic environment is closely related to depth of outreach of MFIs, especially with 
respect to financial development and openness, as measured by DCPS and FDI respectively.  
In terms of the potential impact of institutional-specific control variables on depth of outreach, 
AGE is negatively and significantly associated with ALB in columns (1) to (3), indicating that 
younger MFIs may be more inclined to target wealthier borrowers, this perhaps indicating a kind 
of collective mission drift at the ‘industry level.’ In recent years, with increasing 
commercialization in microfinance, younger MFIs especially those regulated and commercial 
MFIs may focus on serving better-off customers, thus having larger ALB as compared to older 
MFIs. Other literature has demonstrated a negative correlation between age of MFIs and financial 
performance (Hermes et al., 2011; Mersland et al., 2011; Barry & Tacneng, 2014). This is 
consistent with the theory that younger MFIs disburse larger loans to wealthier customers in order 
to achieve better financial performance. The coefficient of SCALE is positive and significant at 
the 10% level in column (5) when including all five macroeconomic variables in the panel model, 
which implies that larger scale MFIs may be negatively related to depth of outreach since they 
usually provide larger loans to clients as compared to smaller scale MFIs. This result is consistent 
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with the findings of Mersland et al. (2011) and Assefa et al. (2013) which show that the assets size 
of MFIs is positively and significantly correlated with average loan size.  
 
   6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
In recent years, MFIs in many developing countries have turned to focus on financial benefits 
rather than social performance and opted to extend larger loans to better-off customers, gradually 
departing from their original social mission. This raises the question of mission drift. In this paper, 
we try to empirically reveal whether there is indeed a potential trade-off between MFIs’ financial 
performance and depth of outreach, and also explore macroeconomic influences on MFIs’ depth of 
outreach.  
With respect to the mission drift issue, our empirical results support the view that there is a 
potential trade-off between MFI’s operational self-sufficiency and depth of outreach. This is in 
line with the findings of Cull et al.(2007), Hermes et al. (2011), but in contrast with the 
conclusions of Mersland & Strm (2010), Quayes (2012) and Louis et al. (2013). However, we 
also find the sample’s financial revenue to average total assets ratio is significantly negatively 
associated with depth of outreach which confirms that smaller loans are associated with higher 
interest rates.  
Turning to the potential influences of country-specific macroeconomic environment on MFIs’ 
depth of outreach, our empirical results show that both foreign direct investment and domestic 
private credit availability are negatively and significantly associated with MFIs’ depth of outreach. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that MFI mission drift is partly driven by external economic 
factors.   
In terms of the potential impact of institutional-specific control variables on MFIs’ depth of 
outreach, the empirical results confirm that a more commercial focus on better-off clients by MFIs 
may result in lower depth of outreach. Our findings also imply that older MFIs reach poorer 
borrowers, and larger scale MFIs may be negatively related to depth of outreach as they provide 
larger loans to their customers. 
 The results of the paper show that concern about MFIs mission drift should take into account not 
only their own strategic choices but also wider macroeconomic influences. MFI-specific factors 
such as financial targeting do not give the whole picture when discussing the determinants of 
MFIs mission drift. We need to investigate more deeply the influence of country-specific factors 
also.  
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